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Abstract 
This study examines a group of nonprofits rated four stars by Charity Navigator. The purpose is to determine whether 
this select group of charities exhibits characteristics associated with top charitable organizations, or whether the four-star 
rating achieved is limited to the more narrow financial metrics employed in the methodology utilized by Charity 
Navigator. This study finds that organizations rated four stars by Charity Navigator show a lower level of excess cash 
holdings, report a lower level of compensation expenses and exhibit lower sensitivity of compensation to performance. 
Financially, these organizations are less vulnerable than their lower rated peers. The results from this study shed light on 
the continuing debate of the effectiveness of rating agencies to accurately identify top performing charitable 
organizations. 
Keywords: Nonprofits, Rating agencies, Information intermediaries 
1. Introduction 
The current economic period in the United States has been dubbed the “Great Recession,” and for good reason. From the 
start of the current economic downturn in December 2007, GDP has declined significantly while the unemployment rate 
has soared (Isidore 2009). The economic decline has placed considerable strain on nonprofit organizations delivering 
social services. The recession has seen a drop in funding to nonprofits while at the same time demand for basic living 
services such as food and shelter has risen sharply (Cardwell 2009). In fact, over half of charities have seen a decrease in 
donations in 2009, and 93% are feeling the effects of the downturn (Strott 2009). The competition for donations is fierce 
while donors have significantly fewer resources to allocate to charitable organizations. 
Increasingly, charity monitoring groups have stepped into a prominent role in the market for charitable giving. Traffic to 
the websites of these monitoring groups is growing, further increasing their collective clout as information 
intermediaries in the market for contributions (Lowell et al. 2005). Two of the largest of these groups are the Better 
Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance and Charity Navigator (Lowell et al. 2005). Prior research has found that donors 
respond to assessment of the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance (Chen 2009; Sloan 2008) and star ratings of 
Charity Navigator (Gordon et al. 2009). However, criticism abounds as to the effectiveness of ratings. Critics note that 
charitable organizations are complex and that ratings focused on financial ratios fail to adequately measure the impact a 
charitable organization has made towards its chosen mission (Niehaus 2003; Lowell et al. 2005). 
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The purpose of this study is to examine a group of nonprofit organizations rated four stars by Charity Navigator, to 
determine whether  this select group of charities exhibits characteristics associated with top charitable organizations, or 
whether the four-star rating achieved is limited to the more narrow financial metrics employed in the methodology 
utilized by Charity Navigator. The findings suggest that organizations rated four stars by Charity Navigator report a 
lower level of excess cash holdings and executive compensation than their lower rated peers. In addition, compensation 
paid to executives of four-star charities is less sensitive to external performance metrics and the sensitivity is weaker 
when more resources are available. Finally, financially, four-star rated charities are less vulnerable than their zero- to 
three-star peers after controlling for size. Overall, four-star organizations exhibit some desirable characteristics beyond 
the financial metrics used to rate them. The results of this study shed light on the continuing debate of the effectiveness 
of rating agencies to accurately identify top performing charitable organizations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces Charity Navigator and discusses studies 
that have examined the characteristics of rated organizations. Our research questions are discussed in the third section. 
The fourth section describes the sample and data, followed by our analyses in the fifth section. This paper is concluded 
with limitations and a few final remarks. 
2. Charity Navigator and Prior Literature 
2.1 Charity Navigator 
Charity Navigator, named one of the fifty coolest websites by Time (2006), was visited by more than four million 
donors in 2008 and is the largest of the charity rating agencies (Charity Navigator 2009). Among numerous accolades 
the website has received a Forbes award for "Best of the Web" twice, was chosen by PC World as "One of America's 
Top Websites," and in 2007, was inducted into BusinessWeek’s "Philanthropy Hall of Fame" for "revolutionizing the 
process of giving" (Charity Navigator 2009).   
Charity Navigator aims to help individual donors to choose contribution recipients. Consistent with this goal, Charity 
Navigator evaluates only public charities. More specifically, these public charities show strong dependence on public 
donations. They report at least $500,000 public support in the most recent fiscal year. They also have filed Form 990s 
with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for at least four years and they are based in the United States. These 
organizations do not need to have any relation with Charity Navigator. In addition, donors can place a request of rating 
for organizations they are interested in. 
Charity Navigator assigns points to each organization it rates in seven categories. The seven categories include program 
expense ratio, administrative expense ratio, fundraising expense ratio, fundraising efficiency, revenue growth, program 
expense growth, and working capital. Each of the seven categories is worth a maximum of ten points. Thus, a charity 
meeting the top requirement in each category would receive a maximum of 70 points. A charity that receives at least 60 
total points receives a four-star rating from Charity Navigator. Conversely, a charity with less than 25 total points would 
receive zero stars. (Note 1) An organization rated four-stars has obtained the best rating Charity Navigator offers and is 
widely cited as an exemplary organization. Charity Navigator prominently displays four-star rated organizations by 
providing a link on its homepage to an exclusive list of four-star organizations. Organizations also proudly display the 
four-star rating on their websites. (Note 2) Further validating the significance of the Charity Navigator ratings, Gordon 
et al. (2009) find that a change in the star rating of an organization is associated with a concurrent change in 
contributions flowing into the organization. A follow up study by Grant (2010) supports the notion that donors respond 
to the Charity Navigator ratings. (Note 3) The significance of the four-star rating motivates the significance of studying 
the underlying characteristics of these organizations. 
2.2 Review of the Extant Literature 
While the academic study of rating agencies is in its infancy in the nonprofit sector, there exists a robust literature on the 
effectiveness of ratings in the for-profit sector. Rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s have long 
provided ratings of bond and stock issues of publicly traded companies. Prior literature has found that a refinement in 
Moody’s Rating system leads to an increase in debt value, a fall in equity value, and a decline in the volatilities implied 
by the price of options when Moody’s announces better than expected ratings (Kliger and Sarig 2000). In addition, 
excess bond returns are associated with rating changes by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (Hand et al. 1992). The 
information content of the credit ratings increased after Regulation FD and nonpublic disclosures were limited (Jorion et 
al. 2005). Finally, recent conservatism exhibited by the rating agencies has affected the debt spreads and capital structure 
of companies (Baghai et al. 2011). 
Not to be outdone, equity analysts will make buy and sell recommendations based on their review of the value of the 
stock relative to its market value. Prior literature has found that the release of analyst’s buy (sell) recommendations is 
associated with an increase (decrease) in stock price even when there is no new information released about a stock 
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(Womack 1996). In decomposing analysts’ recommendations, stocks with strong buy recommendations tend to have 
more recent positive EPS momentum and surprise, recent positive relative price momentum, and recent positive EPS 
forecast revisions (Stickel 2007). These stocks also have stronger balance sheets and have higher long-term EPS growth 
forecasts (Stickel 2007). Similar to the literature on rating agencies and analyst in the for-profit sector, this study builds 
off of Gordon et al. (2009) to determine the characteristics of four-star organizations and information content signaled to 
the market for charitable contributions. The next section discusses our research questions. 
3. Research Questions 
One marked difference between for-profit and nonprofit enterprises is that a nonprofit organization lacks a residual 
claimant (i.e. no shareholders). Fama and Jensen (1983, pg. 342) conclude that “The absence of residual claims avoids 
the donor-residual claimant agency problem and explains the dominance of nonprofits in donor-financed activities.” 
This has been a common view shared by many concerning the level of agency cost in nonprofit organizations. However, 
agency problems do exist in nonprofit organizations in the form of excessive compensation and entrenchment, and these 
problems are exacerbated if the nonprofit organization is not properly monitored (Hansman 1996). The relatively weak 
outside monitoring mechanisms, coupled with the fact that the typical nonprofit Board of Directors serves primarily in a 
fundraising capacity result in few monitors of management activities. Fisman and Hubbard (2005) note that 
organizations will hold precautionary savings, which is referred to as cash holdings in the context of this study, to guard 
against adverse revenue or expenditure shocks. However, they note that the presence of a fund balance to smooth 
expenditures “may facilitate managerial ‘stealing,’ analogous to the free cash holdings described by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) in for profits” (Fisman and Hubbard 2005, pg. 2232).  
Truly exemplary nonprofit organizations are expected to be well run and avoid the agency problems of excess cash 
holdings and compensation that plagues troubled nonprofits. Core et al. (2006) examine various interpretations for 
excess endowment holdings in charitable nonprofits. (Note 4) The authors find that nonprofit organizations with 
persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. They also find that the 
program expense ratio (program expenses divided by total expenses) is lower for organizations with excess endowments 
and there is a positive association between excess endowments and compensation. They conclude that excess 
endowments are associated with greater agency problems. Given the fact exemplary nonprofit organizations are 
expected to have less severe agency problems, our first research question tests whether four-star organizations have a 
lower level of excess cash holdings compared to their lower rated peers. Our first research question is stated as follows: 
RQ1: Do organizations rated four stars by Charity Navigator have a lower level of excess cash holdings 
compared to their lower rated peers? 
A positive relation between executive pay and performance has long been established (Jensen and Murphy 1990). The 
positive relation between pay and performance has also been established in nonprofit organizations (Baber et al. 2002). 
Recently, research has found results consistent with high performing companies having a greater level of pay for 
performance sensitivity in compensation (Baek and Pagan 2006). However, it is not clear whether highly rated nonprofit 
organizations should exhibit a greater pay for performance sensitivity. Critics of external performance measures, such as 
the ratio of program expenses to total expenses, argue that these measures do not capture how effectively a nonprofit 
achieves its mission (Pallotta 2008) (Note 5). If executives of highly rated nonprofit organizations are more effective at 
achieving the organization missions and this effectiveness is mainly captured in unobservable performance metrics, than 
we would expect highly rated nonprofit executives to exhibit a lower pay for performance sensitivity. Research question 
2a tests whether four-star organizations have a differential pay for performance sensitivity compared with their lower 
rated peers. 
RQ2a: Do four-star organizations exhibit a differential pay for performance sensitivity than their lower rated 
peers? 
Donors to charitable organizations are diffuse and there have been calls from advocates for increasing donor scrutiny of 
the practices of nonprofits to ensure that compensation is just and reasonable (Frumkin 2001). Regulators and Congress 
have responded to the concerns over compensation practices of nonprofits by probing nonprofits about their 
compensation practices and procedures (IRS 2004). In addition, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector issued a report sent to 
Congress and the IRS, recommending more than 120 actions be taken by the IRS, Congress, and charitable organizations 
(Clolery 2005). Among the actions to be taken the Panel recommended that Congress strengthen the penalties levied on 
board members who approve and executives who receive excessive compensation, that the IRS revise the Form 990 to 
make the total compensation of executives clearer to the public and regulators, and that charitable organization boards 
approve executive compensation each year. Research question 2b tests whether four-star organizations have a lower 
level of compensation compared with their lower rated peers. 
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RQ2b: Do four-star organizations have a lower level of compensation compared to their lower rated peers? 
A major role rating agencies play in the market for charitable contributions is to decipher which organizations are 
financially strong and which organizations are ill prepared to weather the economic down cycles. It was reported that 93 
percent of nonprofits experienced the effects of the recent downturn, and 80 percent had experienced cuts in their 
funding (Strott 2009). Organizations in financial distress are more likely to cut back on services to the community 
thereby less effectively fulfilling the organization’s mission. A financially healthy organization reassures donors that 
contributions will go towards fulfilling the mission and not to prop up a financially distressed organization. Research 
question three tests whether four-star organizations are more financially viable then their lower rated peers.  
RQ3: Do four-star organizations exhibit less financial vulnerability than their lower rated peers?  
4. Sample Selection and Data 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample selection procedures are reported in Table 1. We collected rating information from the Charity Navigator 
website in September 2008. The ratings are for 1,041 unique charities in human services. (Note 6) We retrieve the 
financial information of these charities from their Form 990s. The 2004–2007 information is obtained from the 
GuideStar database and supplemented with hand collected data. The 1999-2003 information is digitized financial data 
from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). We could not obtain financial information for 113 charities. 
We further reduce the sample for missing or outlier values of compensation. Our final sample includes 815 charities. 
Because the investigation of each research question requires different financial data, the number of observations may 
vary from model to model. For example, the excess cash holding model requires five consecutive years of financial data 
while the compensation model does not. In cases such as missing one year of data, it affects the sample size of the 
excess cash holding model more than the compensation model.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2 Data 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 815 charities over their rating years. The mean (median) of total assets 
is $19.503 ($6.001) million. The mean (median) of total revenue is $19.829 ($5.371) million. The fact that the means are 
greater than the medians suggests the importance of controlling for size in later analyses. We specify compensation as 
the total compensation to current and former officers, directors, key employees, and disqualified persons (column A of 
lines 25a, 25b, and 25c). The mean (median) compensation is $239 thousand ($143 thousand). The change measures 
have fewer observations because of additional data requirements. The mean (median) change in revenue is $2.471 
($0.274) million. The mean (median) percent change in total compensation is 17.1 percent (6 percent). Approximately 
11 percent of the sample changes their rating to a four-star. On average, liabilities are about 18.6 percent of total assets. 
Administrative expenses are approximately 8.7 percent of total revenue.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The sample includes 49 zero-star, 226 one-star, 556 two-star, 828 three-star, and 673 four-star ratings. In Table 3, we 
report the descriptive statistics by rating. The statistics show that in the rating year, differences in total assets by rating 
are not as much as those in total revenue or total expenses. The four-star group has greater changes in total revenue than 
other groups do. The median total compensation is comparable from the one-star group to the four-star group, and the 
majority of their compensation has increased from the previous year. Program ratios, program expenses as a percentage 
of total revenue, are generally greater in the three- and four-star groups, but there are also high ratios in the one- and 
two-star groups. Compared to the previous year, most program ratios are lower. This is the case across all rating groups. 
Liabilities in the four-star group are a smaller fraction of total assets than those in other groups. The difference between 
total revenue and total expenses scaled by total revenue, defined as margin in this study, is higher in the four-star group 
than in other groups. Administrative expenses are a smaller percentage of total revenue in the four-star group than in 
other groups. Details are presented in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5. Findings 
In this section, we empirically examine the characteristics of four-star charities. We compare excess cash holdings of 
four-star charities with those of their lower rated peers in the year following the rating. We examine whether the 
pay-performance association is different for four-star charities than for all other charities. We also compare four-star 
charities and other charities in financial vulnerability in the future. 
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5.1 RQ1: Excess Cash Holdings 
Following Core et al. (2006), we measure excess cash holdings as the residual of the cash holding expectation model:  
Cash Holdingsit / Expensesit = β0 + β1 CVRevit + β2 Ln Revenueit + β3 Access to Debtit +β4 Access to Debt*CVRevit + βj 
State + βm Year + εit                       (1) 
where Cash Holdings is liquid assets that is the sum of cash (line 45, column b), savings (line 46, column b), investments 
on publicly-traded securities (line 54a, column b), and investments on other securities (line 54b, column b); Expenses is 
total expenses (line 17); CVRev is the coefficient of variation of total revenue (line 12), measured as the ratio of the 
standard deviation of total revenue to the mean of total revenue over the last five years up to the year of rating; Ln Revenue 
is the natural logarithm of total revenue (line 12); Access to Debt is an indicator variable, equal 1 if the charity has 
tax-exempt bond liabilities (line 64a, column b) or mortgages and other notes payable (line 64b, column b) in the last five 
years up to the year of rating; Access to Debt*CVRev is the interaction term of Access to Debt and CVRev; State is the 
indicator variable of the state where the organization is incorporated; and Year is the indicator variable of the rating year. 
(Notes 7 & 8) 
This expectation model captures the factors that determine the level of precautionary funds. It is expected that charities 
with fluctuating revenue, captured by CVRev, require a large amount of cash holdings to deal with uncertainty. In 
contrast, large charities, measured by Ln Revenue, and charities with access to debt, measured by Access to Debt, have a 
lower demand for readily available funds. Having access to debt also mediates the pressure brought by the fluctuation in 
revenue. Indicator variables, State, control for differences across states in legal environment, reporting requirements, 
income level, demand level for charitable service, and growth opportunity for charities. Indicator variable, Year, controls 
for year-specific variations in economic, legal, and social events. Continuous variables in model (1) are winsorized by 
year at the 1 and 99 percent levels.  
Table 4 reports the results of the comparison of excess cash holdings. In Panel A of Table 4, the two-sample t-test shows 
that in the year following the rating, the excess cash holdings of four-star charities are significantly lower than those of 
other charities (t = -3.86, p = 0.00). As descriptive analyses in Table 2 indicate that sample charities are skewed in size, 
we further test whether the difference in excess cash holdings is essentially a size effect. We match the four-star charities 
with the zero- to three-star charities by various measures of size and then compare their excess cash holdings. Charities 
from the two rating groups are first matched on total assets. The z-test (z = -4.79, p = 0.00) shows that charities with a 
four-star rating have significantly less excess cash holdings than their lower rated peers in the year following the rating. 
Charities are next matched on total revenue. Four-star charities show significantly lower excess cash holdings than zero- 
to three-star charities in the year after the rating (z = -4.16, p = 0.00). When charities are matched on direct support, the 
phenomenon of lower excess cash holdings for four-star charities still exists in the year after the rating (z = -3.06, p = 
0.00). Matching the charities on total contribution, four-star charities exhibit lower excess cash holdings than their lower 
rated peers in the year after rating (z = -2.62, p = 0.01). When charities are matched on unrestricted assets as reported, 
the z-test shows that four-star charities have a significantly lower level of excess cash holdings than their lower rated 
peers (z = -5.19, p = 0.00). In sum, charities rated four stars have significantly lower excess cash holdings compared to 
their lower rated peers, and this phenomenon is not driven by size. (Note 9)  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5.2 RQ2a and RQ2b: Pay-Performance Association and Executive Compensation 
To examine the association between pay and performance and whether four-star charities behave differently than other 
charities, we test the following level model: 
Ln Compensationit = β0 + β1 Ln Revenueit + β2 Ln Program Ratioit + β3 4-Starit     
+β4 Ln Revenueit * 4-Starit    + β5 Ln Program Ratioit * 4-Starit     
+ βj State + βm Year + εit                     (2) 
where Ln Compensation is the natural logarithm of total compensation (column A of lines 25a, 25b, and 25c); Ln 
Program Ratio is the natural logarithm of program expenses (line 13) as a ratio of total expenses (line17); 4-Star, an 
indicator variable, equals 1 if the rating is a four-star, and 0 otherwise; State and Year are indicator variables as defined in 
model (1).     
This model is in the spirit of the Baber et al. (2002) model that compensation is a function of both resources available 
and the relative spending on charitable services. The effects of individual age, experience, and tenure with the charity 
are assumed to be random, as the dependent variable is total compensation to a wide range of people, including current 
and former officers, directors, key employees, and disqualified persons. The benchmark model in column (I) of Table 5 
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does not include 4-Star and its interaction terms. It shows that total compensation and total revenue are positively 
associated, while total compensation and the program expense as a percentage of total expenses are not. It appears that 
program ratio is not as emphasized as total revenue in compensation. In column (II), we add the 4-Star variable to the 
model. The coefficient on this variable is significantly negative, suggesting that after controlling for revenue and 
program ratio, four-star charities are associated with lower compensation. Adding the interaction between 4-Star and Ln 
Revenue to the model in column (III), only the coefficient on Ln Revenue is significantly different than zero. In column 
(IV), the interaction between 4-Star and Ln Program Ratio is significantly negative, suggesting that the sensitivity of 
pay to relative performance is weaker for four-star charities than for other charities. The complete model in column (V) 
shows that the coefficient on the three-way interaction term is significantly negative, suggesting that the pay to relative 
performance is weaker when more resources is available for four-star charities than for zero- to three-star charities.  
In summary, after controlling for resources available and relative performance in charitable service, four-star charities 
exhibit lower total compensation than other charities do. The compensation sensitivity to relative performance is weaker 
for four-star charities than for all other charities. And the sensitivity is even weaker when more resources are available.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5.3 RQ3: Financial Vulnerability 
In this section, we compare the financial vulnerability of four-star charities with that of their lower-rated peers. We use 
two models to estimate the financial vulnerability index (FVI). Our first measure, FVI_1, follows Greenlee and Trussel 
(2000): 
FVI_1 = 1/(1+e-z)          (3) 
where, Z = -3.0610 + 0.1153*Equity + 1.2528*Concentration – 2.2639*Admin –3.4289*Margin; Equity is total equity 
(line 59b – line 66b) divided by total revenue (line12); Concentration is the revenue concentration ratio, which is the 
total of the squares of each revenue source as a percentage of total revenue; Admin is the administrative expense (line 14) 
scaled by total revenue (line 12); and Margin is the difference between total revenue (line 12) and total expense (line 17) 
and then scaled by total revenue. Greenlee and Trussel (2000) suggest that a greater than 0.10 value is a strong indicator 
of financial vulnerability, a less than 0.07 value is a strong indicator of no financial vulnerability, and a value in between 
0.07 and 0.10 is not a clear indicator of either situation.   
Our second measure, FVI_2, follows Trussel et al. (2002). Here, the estimation of Z is primarily modified by taking size 
into consideration: Z = 0.7754 + 0.9272*Debt + 0.1496*Concentration + 0.1206*Admin – 2.8419*Margin -0.1665*Size; 
where Debt is total liabilities (line 66b) scaled by total assets (line 59b); Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (line 
59b); and other variables are defined as above. Because of the change in the model, Trussel et al. (2002) adjust the cutoff 
point for the assessment of financial vulnerability. If the value is greater than 0.20, then it indicates that the charity will 
be financially vulnerable. If the value is less than 0.10, then it indicates that the charity will not be financially vulnerable. 
No clear indication is made by a value in the range of 0.10 and 0.20.  
We compute all the financial measures used in the calculation of FVI_1 and FVI_2. We check the correlations between 
these measures and the seven measures used by Charity Navigator to rate nonprofit organizations. Note that Admin in 
the calculation of FVI is scaled by total revenue and the Administration Expense by Charity Navigator is scaled by total 
functional expenses.  As reported in Table 6 Panel A, these two measures are significantly correlated. The correlation 
between Equity and Working Capital Ratio is also relatively high. This is because working capital is calculated in a 
similar way as equity. Except for the Spearman correlation between Admin and Program Expenses, the absolute values 
of other correlations between the two groups are not greater than 0.50, suggesting that it is unlikely that there is a 
mechanical relation between the Charity Navigator rating and the financial vulnerability index. In addition, the 
correlations between 4-Star and the variables used to calculate the financial vulnerability index are low – the absolute 
values of these correlations are less than 0.22. To further reduce the concern for mechanical relation, we compare the 
financial vulnerability measures in the year after the rating.  
In Table 6 Panel B, we compare financial vulnerability across rating groups. Four-star charities have comparable FVI_1 
values as other charities do (t = -0.81, p = 0.42). However, when the size effect is considered in the calculation of the 
index such as in FVI_2 , four-star charities exhibit significantly lower FVI_2 values than other charities do (t = -3.69, 
p=0.00). We further define LFV_1 as 1 if FVI_1 indicates that the charity will not be in financial trouble, and 0 
otherwise. LFV_2 is defined in a similar way based on the value of FVI_2. Comparing the means of LFV_1, the t-test 
indicates that four-star charities do not have advantages in financial health (t =0.27, p=0.79). However, the test of the 
difference in the means of LFV_2 suggests that more four-star charities are financially healthy than charities in lower 
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rated groups (t = 1.85, p = 0.07). Table 6 provides evidence that after controlling for size, four-star charities exhibit 
characteristics consistent with low probability of financial vulnerability in the future. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5.4 Comparison with Three-Star Charities 
Charity Navigator star ratings are derived from numeric scores. The difference in the numeric scores between a four-star 
(60-70) and a three-star (50-60) rating is less than 20 points. We examine whether the characteristics four-star charities 
exhibit above still hold when they are only compared with the closely rated three-star charities. The results show that 
four-star charities have significantly less excess cash holdings than three-star charities do in the year after rating. The 
sensitivity of compensation to performance is similar for four-star charities and three-star charities. Four-star charities 
are comparable to three-star charities in the probability of being financially vulnerable and the percentage of financially 
stable charities is not significantly different for these two rating groups. Overall, four-star charities exhibit 
characteristics associated with lower agency costs relative to three-star organizations. 
6. Limitations and Concluding Remarks 
The importance of rating agencies in the market for charitable contributions has been well documented in the literature 
(Gordon et al. 2009; Chen 2009; Sloan 2008). Charity Navigator, one of the largest rating agencies, has grown in 
influence in recent years. However, a lingering question has been how informative the ratings by the rating agencies are. 
Specifically, this study addresses whether the Charity Navigator four-star rating truly represents exemplary nonprofit 
organizations. When compared to organizations rated toward the bottom of Charity Navigator’s rating scale (0~3 stars), 
we find that four-star organizations have a lower level of excess cash holdings. This finding validates Charity Navigator 
four-star organizations as having a lower level of agency problems, a finding we would expect among top rated 
nonprofit organizations. Top rated organizations are expected to be financially secure to effectively carry out their 
mission. As expected, we find that four-star organizations are less financially vulnerable than their lower rated peers. 
Finally, we find that four-star rated organizations have lower levels of executive compensation and a lower level of pay 
for performance sensitivity compared to their lower rated peers. The compensation finding is interesting and should 
provide further support for four-star rated organizations prudently managing resources. In sum, four-star organizations 
present some characteristics consistent with what the public desire for top nonprofit organizations. 
There are a couple of limitations to this current study. First, Charity Navigator only rates a sample of larger nonprofits. 
Findings from this study do not generalize to the majority of nonprofits that are not rated by Charity Navigator. Second, 
our study highlights characteristics associated with a four-star rating. We cannot draw a causal link between these 
characteristics and achieving a high rating. Additionally, our study focuses on one sector of nonprofit organizations, 
human services, and thus, our findings may not be generalized to other nonprofit sectors.  
Notwithstanding the limitations of the study, the results of this study should be of interest to nonprofit stakeholders and 
others with an interest in the market for charitable contributions. This study provides empirical evidence validating the 
growing role information intermediaries are playing in the market for charitable contributions and sheds light on the 
debate of the credibility of the ratings of nonprofit organizations. Fruitful avenues of future research would be to further 
investigate the implications of consistency across ratings agencies, as well as developing additional metrics by which 
nonprofit organizations, and by extension, rating agencies may be judged.    
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Note 1. For a current review of the Charity Navigator methodology, please visit its website at www.charitynavigator.org. 
Note 2. A search for four-star organizations revealed multiple organizations that prominently displayed their four stars 
Charity Navigator rating. In fact, Charity Navigator informs organizations of their four-star ratings and offers a 
specialized logo the charity can use to prominently display their four-star rating. This service is only offered to four-star 
organizations per the Charity Navigator website. Please refer to the following link for details: 
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=483#74. 
Note 3. An exception to studies finding that ratings matter is Szper and Prakash (2011). They find no association 
between a change in star rating and a change in contributions. 
Note 4. Core et al. (2006) use the term “excess endowment.” We use the term “excess cash holdings” to avoid the 
confusion with the general meaning of “endowment” as a permanently restricted fund balance. 
Note 5. Consider the case of a food bank. Two organizations (A and B) can spend 80% of their total dollars on program 
related expenses. However, organization A is able to serve twice as many needy families as organization B by reducing 
program related staff, and centralizing distribution of food services. 
Note 6. We decided to focus on one major classification, human services, to ensure variation in ratings and to eliminate 
potential differences across organization classifications. 
Note 7. Due to data limitation, we define the variable Access to Debt using five years instead of ten years of data as in 
the Core et al. (2006) study. We do not include indicator variables for industry as Core et al. (2006) do because charities 
in our sample are all from the human services category. 
Note 8. The line numbers correspond to the line numbers on the Form 990. 
Note 9. Because management may have limited access to restricted assets for precautionary purpose, Core et al. (2006) 
scaled the unrestricted assets measure by total expenses and used it as the dependent variable in model (1). They propose 
to use the residual from the model as an alternative measure of excess cash holding. Our inferences are not affected by 
adopting this alternative measure of excess cash holding. 
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Table 1. Sample selection 
 
 Charities
Human services charities rated by Charity Navigator 1,041
Less: charities with no financial information 113
Charity with financial data 928
Less: charities without consecutive years of ratings 10
Charities with two or three consecutive years of ratings 918
Less: charities with missing compensation data 98
Charities with financial information to estimate percent change in compensation 820
Less: charities only with influential observations in estimating the compensation change model  5
Final sample 815
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  N  Mean Std Dev Q1 Median  Q3 
Total Assets ($)  2332  19,503 41,229 2,473 6,001  15,970
Total Revenue ($)  2332  19,829 162,733 2,467 5,371  12,639
Total Compensation ($)  2332  239 259 83 143  297 
Total Expense ($)  2332  18,544 152,674 2,274 5,025  11,484
Program Expense ($)  2332  16,478 142,127 1,687 4,016  9,843 
Program Ratio  2332  0.765 0.214 0.663 0.783  0.893 
∆Revenue ($)  2313  2,471 45,321 (197) 274  1,229 
% ∆Compensation  2246  0.171 0.795 0.00 0.06  0.18 
∆ Program Ratio  2313  -0.012 0.217 -0.075 -0.005  0.060 
Change to 4  1494  0.110 0.313 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Excess Cash holding   2167  -0.038 1.341 -0.586 -0.256  0.114 
Debt  2332  0.186 0.397 0.032 0.092  0.225 
Equity  2332  1.469 1.804 0.426 0.980  1.784 
Concentration  2332  0.662 2.940 0.407 0.559  0.795 
Margin  2332  0.052 0.229 -0.016 0.038  0.123 
Admin  2332  0.087 0.092 0.042 0.078  0.114 
Dollar amounts ($) are in thousands (000). 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. Total Assets ($) is total assets at the end of the year (line 59, column b). 
Total Revenue ($) is the overall income of the year (line 12). Total Compensation ($) is the total compensation to current and former 
officers, directors, key employees, and disqualified persons (column A of lines 25a, 25b, and 25c). Total Expenses ($) is the total of 
program expenses, management expenses, fundraising expenses, and payments to affiliates (line 17). Program Expense ($) is the 
expense on charity programs (line 13). Program Ratio is the ratio of program expense to total revenue. ∆Revenue ($) is the difference 
between total revenue in year t and in year t-1. % ∆Compensation is the difference of total compensation between year t and year t-1 
scaled by the year t-1 total contribution. ∆ Program Ratio is the difference between program ratio in year t and year t-1. Change to 4 is 
an indicator variable, equal 1 if the charity’s rating changes from a non-four star rating in yea t-1 to a four-star in year t. Excess cash 
holdings is the excess cash holdings, measured as the residual from model (1) below.  
Cash holdings / Expenseit = β0 + β1 CVRevit + β2 Ln Revenueit + β3 Access to Debt it+ β4 Access to Debt*CVRevit + βj State  
 + βm Year + εit         (1)  
where CVRev is the coefficient of variation of total revenue (line 12), measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of total revenue to 
the mean of total revenue over the last five years up to the year of rating; Ln Revenue is the natural logarithm of total revenue (line 12); 
Access to Debt is an indicator variable, equals 1 if the charity has tax-exempt bond liabilities (line 64a, column b) or mortgages and other 
notes payable (line 64b, column b) in the last five years up to the year of rating; Access to Debt*CVRev is the interaction term of Access 
to Debt and CVRev; State is the indicator variables for states; and Year is the indicator variables for year.  
Debt is total liabilities (line 66b) scaled by total assets (line 59b). Equity is total equity (line 59b – line 66b) divided by total revenue 
(line 12). Concentration is the revenue concentration ratio, which is the total of the squares of each revenue source such as 
contributions to donor advised funds (line 1a), direct public support (line 1b), indirect public support (line 1c) and so on as a 
percentage of the total revenue (line 12). Margin is the difference between total revenue (line 12) and total expense (line 17) and then 
scaled by total revenue. Admin is the administrative expense (line 14) scaled by total revenue (line 12). 
 
www.sciedu.ca/afr                        Accounting and Finance Research                      Vol. 1, No. 1; May 2012 
Published by Sciedu Press 13
Table 3. Descriptive statistics by rating 
 
Rating = 0 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($) 49 2,092 9,047 73 354 943 
Total Revenue ($) 49 3,275 4,797 919 2,063 3,972 
Total Compensation ($) 49 105 94 59 88 121 
Total Expense ($) 49 3,450 5,588 889 2,079 4,073 
Program Expense ($) 49 1,141 3,395 109 258 618 
Program Ratio 49 0.243 0.218 0.081 0.156 0.321 
∆Revenue ($) 49 (455) 984 (858) (181) 79 
% ∆Compensation 47 -0.025 0.407 -0.301 0.000 0.193 
∆ Program Ratio 49 -0.042 0.108 -0.071 -0.009 0.014 
Change to 4 28 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Excess Cash holding  42 -0.634 0.702 -1.004 -0.527 -0.258 
Debt 49 0.773 1.520 0.018 0.176 0.716 
Equity 49 0.273 0.613 0.020 0.058 0.398 
Concentration 49 0.897 0.167 0.840 0.992 1.000 
Margin 49 -0.024 0.087 -0.052 -0.003 0.014 
Admin 49 0.099 0.085 0.054 0.075 0.104 
 
Rating = 1 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($) 226 9,733 20,432 1,503 3,225 7,356 
Total Revenue ($) 226 6,426 14,714 1,591 3,160 5,650 
Total Compensation ($) 226 202 198 87 141 234 
Total Expense ($) 226 6,689 15,321 1,679 3,277 5,876 
Program Expense ($) 226 4,901 11,692 1,181 2,150 4,152 
Program Ratio 226 0.718 0.203 0.617 0.716 0.806 
∆Revenue ($) 224 (926) 8,069 (442) (58) 217 
% ∆Compensation 221 0.132 0.507 -0.057 0.028 0.176 
∆ Program Ratio 224 0.000 0.174 -0.070 -0.017 0.066 
Change to 4 146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Excess Cash holding  208 -0.150 1.102 -0.519 -0.256 0.015 
Debt 226 0.213 0.301 0.045 0.136 0.254 
Equity 226 1.344 2.075 0.406 0.848 1.378 
Concentration 226 0.642 0.222 0.463 0.615 0.836 
Margin 226 -0.036 0.185 -0.089 -0.014 0.039 
Admin 226 0.129 0.081 0.076 0.108 0.162 
 
Rating = 2 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($) 556 19,232 41,229 2,159 5,194 14,997 
Total Revenue ($) 556 10,852 21,000 2,139 4,701 11,147 
Total Compensation ($) 556 228 241 83 140 279 
Total Expense ($) 556 10,093 17,166 2,104 4,554 11,066 
Program Expense ($) 556 8,409 14,501 1,620 3,749 8,833 
Program Ratio 556 0.789 0.232 0.673 0.791 0.903 
∆Revenue ($) 548 700 12,274 (395) 99 640 
% ∆Compensation 528 0.211 1.201 -0.005 0.050 0.167 
∆ Program Ratio 548 -0.006 0.242 -0.071 -0.007 0.060 
Change to 4 350 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Excess Cash holding  521 0.099 1.456 -0.511 -0.166 0.146 
Debt 556 0.170 0.259 0.034 0.103 0.227 
Equity 556 1.650 2.142 0.477 1.035 1.861 
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Concentration 556 0.584 0.228 0.402 0.526 0.763 
Margin 556 0.004 0.329 -0.040 0.017 0.083 
Admin 556 0.103 0.154 0.051 0.088 0.132 
 
Rating = 3 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($) 828 20,797 40,954 3,172 7,278 17,669 
Total Revenue ($) 828 13,920 28,968 2,718 6,049 12,890 
Total Compensation ($) 828 247 256 85 153 319 
Total Expense ($) 828 12,919 27,792 2,387 5,445 11,656 
Program Expense ($) 828 11,227 25,532 1,863 4,667 9,655 
Program Ratio 828 0.774 0.182 0.679 0.783 0.886 
∆Revenue ($) 822 982 4,664 (143) 328 1,186 
% ∆Compensation 802 0.148 0.536 0.000 0.058 0.178 
∆ Program Ratio 822 -0.005 0.174 -0.073 -0.002 0.068 
Change to 4 529 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Excess Cash holding  769 0.079 1.387 -0.498 -0.209 0.176 
Debt 828 0.169 0.271 0.031 0.091 0.223 
Equity 828 1.624 1.809 0.498 1.124 2.019 
Concentration 828 0.749 4.925 0.395 0.529 0.751 
Margin 828 0.071 0.177 -0.002 0.050 0.142 
Admin 828 0.082 0.055 0.041 0.078 0.111 
 
Rating = 4 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($) 673 22,684 47,076 3,117 7,205 18,139 
Total Revenue ($) 673 40,219 299,637 3,280 7,168 17,961 
Total Compensation ($) 673 261 296 84 143 343 
Total Expense ($) 673 37,525 281,170 2,702 6,280 16,458 
Program Expense ($) 673 34,607 261,853 2,242 5,467 15,416 
Program Ratio 673 0.789 0.184 0.699 0.814 0.907 
∆Revenue ($) 670 7,096 83,039 105 823 2,748 
% ∆Compensation 648 0.195 0.747 0.008 0.078 0.202 
∆ Program Ratio 670 -0.026 0.258 -0.087 -0.004 0.055 
Change to 4 441 0.372 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Excess Cash holding  627 -0.219 1.256 -0.811 -0.367 0.039 
Debt 673 0.169 0.424 0.029 0.076 0.205 
Equity 673 1.259 1.340 0.376 0.924 1.669 
Concentration 673 0.610 0.230 0.408 0.579 0.819 
Margin 673 0.102 0.183 0.007 0.061 0.174 
Admin 673 0.065 0.043 0.027 0.062 0.095 
 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics by Charity Navigator ratings. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 4. Comparison of excess cash holdings (rating=4 vs. rating= 0~3) 
 
Panel A: 
 
Rating=4  Rating=0~3 Difference t  p 
-0.212  0.020 -0.232 -3.86  0.00 
 
Panel B: 
 
Matching Variable N  Coefficient Standard Error z  P>|z| 
   
Total Assets 2188  -0.362 0.076 -4.79  0.00 
Total Revenue 2188  -0.309 0.074 -4.16  0.00 
Direct Support 2188  -0.222 0.073 -3.06  0.00 
Total Contribution 2188  -0.196 0.075 -2.62  0.01 
Unrestricted Assets 2188  -0.385 0.074 -5.19  0.00 
   
 
This table compares the year t+1 excess cash holdings of 4-star charity-years with that of 0-3 star charity-years. The comparison is 
based on the rating for year t. Observations are first compared without controlling for size in Panel A.  And then observations are 
matched by total assets, by total revenue, by direct support, by total contribution, and by unrestricted assets in Panel B. 
 
Excess cash holdings is the residual from model (1) below. 
Cash holdings / Expenseit = β0 + β1 CVRevit + β2 Ln Revenueit + β3 Access to Debt it+ β4 Access to Debt*CVRevit + βj State  
 + βm Year + εit         (1)  
where Cash Holdings is liquid assets that is the total of cash (line 45, column b), savings (line 46, column b), investments on 
publicly-traded securities (line 54a, column b), and investments on other securities (line 54b, column b); Expenses is total expenses 
(line 17); CVRev is the coefficient of variation of total revenue (line 12), measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of total revenue 
to the mean of total revenue over the last five years up to the year of rating; Ln Revenue is the natural logarithm of total revenue (line 
12); Access to Debt is an indicator variable, equals 1 if the charity has tax-exempt bond liabilities (line 64a, column b) or mortgages and 
other notes payable (line 64b, column b) in the last five years up to the year of rating; Access to Debt*CVRev is the interaction term of 
Access to Debt and CVRev; State is the indicator variables for states; and Year is the indicator variables for year.  
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Table 5. Effect of four-star rating on pay-performance sensitivity 
 
Variable  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
 
Intercept  5.116*** 5.095*** 5.022*** 4.868*** 6.025*** 
 (15.99) (16.00) (14.21) (15.70) (12.63) 
Ln Revenue  0.434*** 0.439*** 0.443*** 0.458*** 0.383*** 
 (22.69) (22.93) (20.25) (24.27) (12.41) 
Ln Program Ratio  -0.132 -0.102 -0.105 -0.057 3.795*** 
 (-1.48) (-1.18) (-1.20) (-0.74) (2.66) 
4-Star  -0.108*** 0.117 -0.523*** -0.123 
 (-2.73) (0.24) (-5.88) (-0.11) 
Ln Revenue*4-Star  -0.014 -0.023 
      (-0.45) (-0.34) 
Ln Program Ratio*   -2.881*** 11.206 
     4-Star  (-5.11) (1.61) 
Ln Revenue* Ln Program     -0.259*** 
    Ratio  (-2.61) 
Ln Revenue* Ln Program   -0.898** 
    Ratio*4-Star  (-2.03) 
 
State Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N =   2293 2293 2293 2293 2293 
R2 =  42.82% 43.11% 43.12% 45.14% 45.27% 
# of clusters =  815 815 815 815 815 
 
This table presents the effect of the four-star rating on pay-performance sensitivity. Ln Compensation is the natural logarithm of total 
compensation (column A of lines 25a, 25b, and 25c); Ln Program Ratio is the natural logarithm of program expenses (line 13) as a ratio 
of total expenses (line17); 4-Star is an indicator variable, equals 1 if the rating is a four-star, and 0 otherwise; State is the indicator 
variables for states; and Year is the indicator variables for year. Under the parameter estimates are t-statistics in parentheses, calculated 
based on clustered standard errors.  **, *** represent significance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6. Comparison of financial vulnerability (rating=4 vs. rating= 0~3) 
 
Panel B: Comparison of financial vulnerability 
 Rating=4 Rating=0~3    
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Difference  t  p 
FVI_1  0.088  0.087 0.091 0.086 -0.003  -0.81  0.42
FVI_2  0.158  0.109 0.177 0.120 -0.019  -3.69  0.00
LFV_1  0.452  0.498 0.446 0.497 0.006  0.27  0.79
LFV_2  0.227  0.419 0.192 0.394 0.035  1.85  0.07
 
This table examines the correlations between variables used to compute the financial vulnerability index and variables used to 
calculate Charity Navigator ratings. It also compares the year t+1 financial vulnerability of four-star charities and lower rated 
charities. Variables used to compute the financial vulnerability index are obtained from Form 990s. Debt is total liabilities (line 66b) 
scaled by total assets (line 59b). Equity is total equity (line 59b – line 66b) divided by total revenue (line 12). Concentration is the 
revenue concentration ratio, which is the total of the squares of each revenue source such as contributions to donor advised funds (line 
1a), direct public support (line 1b), indirect public support (line 1c) and so on as a percentage of the total revenue (line 12). Admin is 
the administrative expense (line 14) scaled by total revenue (line 12). Margin is the difference between total revenue (line 12) and 
total expense (line 17) and then scaled by total revenue. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (line 59b). 
Variables used to calculate Charity Navigator ratings are obtained directly from Charity Navigator. Program Expenses is program 
expenses divided by its total functional expenses. Administration Expenses is administrative expenses divided by its total functional 
expenses. Fundraising Expenses is fundraising expenses divided by total expenses. Fundraising Efficiency is fundraising expenses 
divided by total contributions. Primary Revenue Growth is computed as [(Yn/Y0)(1/n)]-1, where Y0 is the revenue measured in the first 
year of the interval analyzed, Yn is the revenue measured at the end of the interval analyzed, and n is the length of the interval in years 
varying from 2 to 4 years. Program Expense Growth is computed as [(Yn/Y0)(1/n)]-1, where Y0 is the program expense measured in the 
first year of the interval analyzed, Yn is the program expense measured at the end of the interval analyzed, and n is the length of the 
interval in years varying from 2 to 4 years. Working Capital Ratio is working capital, including cash and cash equivalents, savings, 
receivables, investments in securities, accounts and grants payable, and accrued expenses, divided by total expenses. 
The financial vulnerability indexes: FVI_1 is calculated following Greenlee and Trussel (2000):  
FVI_1 = 1/(1+e-z)          (4) 
where Z = -3.0610 + 0.1153*Equity + 1.2528*Concentration – 2.2639*Admin –3.4289*Margin. FVI_2 is calculated using equation (4) 
above (Trussel et al. 2002), but Z=0.7754 + 0.9272*Debt + 0.1496*Concentration + 0.1206*Admin – 2.8419*Margin -0.1665*Size. 
LFV_1 equals 1 if FVI_1 is less than 0.07, and 0 otherwise. LFV_2 equals 1 if FVI_2 is less than 0.10, and 0 otherwise. 
 In Panel A, correlations significant at 0.01 level are in bold, and those significant at 0.05 level are in italic. The column numbers on 
the top of the correlation table corresponds to the variable numbers on the left. p-values in both panels are two-tailed. 
